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Nation-Building in the Penumbra:
Notes from a Liminal Statet
By

MONICA EPPINGER*

I. Landscape Littered with Fallen Giants
The Soviet Union: Second World, workers' vanguard, Evil
Empire, home. In the eyes of the West, the Soviet Union was
decidedly "other," tragic, romantic, or threatening in its radical
alterity. For Ukrainians, by its end, the Soviet Union was the taken
for-granted setting of everyday life. The Ukrainian S.S.R. was one of
the core Soviet republics, in on the Revolution from inception to
stagnation, birthplace of Trotsky and Brezhnev. Part of the Soviet
heartland, it was separated from the West by an Iron Curtain and an
entire Warsaw Pact of buffer states: Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and East Germany.
These Cold War structures, seemingly stable as late as 1989,
proved otherwise over the following fifteen years. Ukraine came to
occupy an uncomfortable middle ground through a series of
unexpected events. In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved with
remarkable tranquility when elites from Ukraine and other republics
t Remarks from The West and the Rest in Comparative Law, 2008 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law (Oct. 2-4, 2008). Presented in the panel, What do the
Rest Think of the West?
* Joint degree candidate, Ph.D./J.D., in the Department of Anthropology, U.C.
Berkeley and Yale Law School. A U.S. diplomat from 1992-2001, she developed
regional expertise in the former Soviet Union through postings to U.S. Embassy in
Kiev and to the Secretary of State's Office for the New Independent States. In Kiev,
she covered the Ukrainian Parliament and the post-Soviet transition process, and
drafted the State Department's 1996 Country Human Rights Report on Ukraine. In
Washington, as member of an interagency working group for strategic energy
diplomacy, Monica Eppinger authored policy for the Secretaries of State, Defense,
Energy, and Commerce and represented the U.S. in negotiations at the Ministerial
level in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
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created independent states by agreement with Moscow. By 2001,
both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and the
European Union ("EU") encompassed the former Warsaw Pact up
to Ukraine's western border. In 2004, the Ukrainian populace
astonished the world (and itself) by staging a peaceful uprising
against rigged elections and a leadership hand-picked by the
Kremlin. This "Orange Revolution" eschewed the red of the past
and aligned Ukraine neither with the red of the Russian flag to the
East nor with the blue of the NATO or EU flags to the West. The
Orange Revolution, while marking a milestone in the widening gap
separating Ukraine from its Soviet past, did not expunge surviving
Soviet habits, assumptions, buildings, and personnel. At the same
time, although still separated by a slim border from encroaching
Western military and economic organizations, foreign institutions multiparty democracy, private property ownership, a market
economy - have advanced across Ukraine, apparently inexorably, to
occupy the present. In this uncomfortable shifted ground, legal
reform has become a primary technology for sorting out the present
and charting a path to the future.
The emergence of post-Socialist legal orders is reshaping some
of the familiar terrain of comparative legal studies. This new
context calls into question the topography of comparison and a
problematic legacy of naming and framing. Vast re-codification
efforts stand at the center of nation-building projects that seem more
of a late nineteenth-century Europe than an early twenty-first
century East. Such changes, and the rupture from which they
emerge, challenge essentialist or static notions of identity,
correlations of territory and culture, and assumptions of where the
West is or where the Rest begin. Based on fourteen months of
fieldwork in Ukraine, this paper reports on how Ukrainians
comprehend "the West." Concepts from anthropology, "liminality"
and "deixis," aid in understanding Ukrainians' ideas of what or
where "the West" is. Examples from Ukrainian legal reform and
observations by Ukrainian legal actors lead us to reconsider
hegemony, integration, mimesis, and agency.

II. Locating the West
The question, "What do the Rest think of the West?" presumes
the salience of some categories that my fieldwork in Ukraine flagged
as suspect. This suspicion was borne out by the immediate reactions
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of Ukrainian interlocutors to the question. "What do we think of
'the West?!' You know we don't think in those old categories
anymore,"1 was a typical reaction. Ukrainian elites were eager to
demonstrate that even ordinary citizens no longer think of "the
West" as a monolith, a view discredited as unsophisticated Cold
War thinking. Even the most unworldly Ukrainians, I was assured,
now distinguish between Europe and "America."
This differentiation came about, in part, when opinions of the
United States fell precipitously after the onset of the U.S. war in
Iraq. Those who had doubted Soviet information about the U.S. now
doubted their doubts. How many of the preposterous-sounding old
accounts of U.S. human rights violations, class oppression, and
international adventurism were actually to be believed? Others who
had doubted altruism as a motive for the NATO bombing of parts of
the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s found their suspicions of U.S.
warmongering confirmed by the war in Iraq. "The West,"
previously identified within the geography of Soviet teleology as an
area enmeshed in a certain stage of bourgeois capitalism, was no
longer a monolith at which Ukrainians directed revile or envy. The
U.S. emerged as an object of Ukrainian disregard and sank in public
consciousness.
By contrast, Europe ("Evropa") is a constant referent in
contemporary Ukraine. A most common use is the expression
"Evroremont," which is contemporary slang for renovating (say,
one's apartment) to a level of comfort and aesthetic appeal that
would pass in Europe. Another compound word, a common form
in which indexing shows up, is "Evrostandardti," a term of art for
legal, regulatory, or ethical standards either borrowed from Europe
or perceived to be up to European snuff. Factories are retooled to
"Evrostandardti," foods are processed to meet "Evrostandardti,"
auditing processes adapted so that companies comply with the
"Evrostandardti" of potential investors prior to an initial public
offering ("IPO"). The lousy food stand across the street from my
apartment selling tough chicken billed itself as the "Evrogrill."
While the Western press stereotypes Eastern Ukraine as "pro1. Telephone interview with Ihor Pryamoyevych, Member of Parliament of
Ukraine 1994-2002 (Sept. 7, 2008). (N.B.: Per common practice in anthropology,
throughout this article pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of
interlocutors. Interviews did happen in date, location, and format noted. The
author keeps on file the original recording or manuscript of each interview.)
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Russian" and Western Ukraine as "pro-Western," Ukrainians
regardless of region, age, or social class were keen to explain that all
aspired to a European standard of living for Ukraine. Despite
divergent views on geopolitical tactics or strategic alliances,
Ukrainians find consensus on that. While we could inquire into
what this pervasive referent of popular culture means, perhaps the
more interesting question is what does its pervasiveness mean?
While the U.S. lies outside of the domain of Ukrainian self
identification, Europe is firmly in Ukrainian sites. Reorienting our
line of inquiry accordingly, we acknowledge that addressing the
question of "How does the Rest see the West?" from a Ukrainian
point of view requires that first we consider the prior question of
where those in Ukraine locate themselves. That informs how
Ukrainian legal elites see the West, and how the West and its forms
are reshaping the legal landscape in Ukraine. The present study
follows Edward Said,2 who attuned us to the work that "the Orient"
has done in the internal construction of "Europe," and Laura Nader,
who alerted us to methodological implications of comparison.3
Inquiry into what Ukrainians think of "the West" allows us to look
at ourselves from the viewpoint of those whose state and
sovereignty are emergent. The fact that Ukraine is a work in
progress, an object in motion, allows us in the West some insight
into stable forms in our own context. The Ukrainian position also
exposes for further scrutiny some of the power relations presumed,
or replicated, in the concepts of "the West" and "the Rest."

III. Over there: Ukraine as Outside of the West
In order to understand how Ukrainians regard the West, the
concept of deixis is a useful starting point. From linguistic
anthropology, deixis concerns the way languages encode or
grammaticalize features of the context of utterance or speech event.4
Some philosophers refer to deictics as "indexical expressions."

2. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (Random House 1978).
3. Laura Nader, Comparative Consciousness, in ASSESSING CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 84-96 (R. Borofsky, ed., McGraw Hill 1994).
4. WILLIAM F. HANKS, REFERENTIAL PRACTICE: LANGUAGE AND LIVED SPACE
AMONG THE MAYA (University of Chigaco Press 1990) [hereinafter HANKS,
REFERENTIAL PRACTICE). See also WILLIAM F. HANKS, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATIVE
PRACTICES 161-62 (Westview Press 1996).
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Peirce calls them "indexical signs"5 and Russell, "egocentric
particulars"6 (which Hanks helpfully amends to "sociocentric").7
Traditional categories of deixis in Western linguistic scholarship are
person, place, and time. Personal deictics encode the speaker's
reference to self, others, or third persons neither speaker nor
addressee, as in the pronouns "I," "you," "they." Place deictics
encode spatial location relative to the location of the speech event.
Time deictics encode temporal points relative to when an utterance
was spoken, as in adverbs of time like "now," "then," "yesterday,"
or "this year," and in verb tense.8
An investigation into "here," "now," and "us" reveals the
succinctness with which langue captures and conveys complex
understandings. The "here and now" proximal zone has the
appearance of concreteness, but as Hanks demonstrates, that is a
false appearance. Our ways of understanding and inhabiting the
proximal zone are far from being simple or natural; an immense
stock of social knowledge orients action and provides the categories
in which we delimit the here and now.9
Other categories of deixis elaborated by later scholars are also
relevant to our inquiry.10 Discursive deixis refers to portions of the
unfolding discourse in which the addressee is located. The
sentence, "Puff, puff, puff: that is what it sounded like," is one
example. Forms of reference to precedent in judicial decisions or
legislative history are others. Social markers indicate distinctions
relative to participant-roles, particularly those between speaker and
addressee or speaker and some referent. Examples are titles of
address, forms of vocatives, or second-person familiar versus formal
pronouns, such as the Ukrainian TH and BH.
Deixis, then, is intimately associated with discourses of
inclusion and exclusion, the definition of "we" and "they," whether
5. C.S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRmNGS OF PEIRCE: SELECTED WRmNGS 107 0Buchler ed., Dover 1955) (1940).
6. BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH (Routledge 1940).
7. HANKS, REFERENTIAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 7-8.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Id. at 7.
10. See J. Lyons, Deixis and Subjectivity: Loquor, Ergo Sum?, in SPEECH, PLACE,
AND ACTION: STUDIES IN DEIXIS AND RELATED TOPICS, 101 (R. Javella and w. Klein
eds., Wiley 1982) and C. Fillmore, Towards a Descriptive Framework for Spatial Deixis,
in SPEECH, PLACE, AND ACTION: STUDIES IN DEIXIS AND RELATED TOPICS 31 (R. Javella
and W. Klein eds., Wiley 1982).
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"you" are one of "us." It encodes social distance. Likewise, it
signals the context-dependent sense of spatial terms, "here" (where
we think "we" are) and "there" (where "they" start) and temporal
terms, "now" (the time of us and our contemporaries) and "then"
(the time of future and past selves). Some temporal deictics are
more specific in Ukrainian than in English. Two words translate
into English as "then," one meaning the past [rn.z:1i, "todi"] and
other, the future [nOTiM, "potim"]. For Ukrainians, the meaning of
"we" and "they," or "here" and "there," may shift depending on the
frame of reference, the "then" of the past or of the future. The
meaning of these deictics has become problematic because of the
peculiar situation of the present.

IV. Time and Place: Liminality and Penumbra
Decoding deictics in contemporary Ukraine is complicated by a
historical peculiarity: the context upon which deictics depend for
meaning has been profoundly disrupted.
For Ukrainians
considering collective identity, part of the problem with locating the
referent for "here" or "there," or "us" or "them," lies in the very fact
that the frame of reference became unmoored with the passing of
the Soviet Union. To understand the kinds of forces exerted on that
context, anthropological work on forms of change offers the useful
concept of liminality. The liminal space: this is where Ukrainians
recognize themselves.
French folklorist Arnold van Gennep introduced the concept of
"liminality" in his 1909 analysis of rites de passage. 11 By this, he
meant such ritual processes as initiations, investitures, weddings,
funerals - in fact, all rites which accompany change of place, state,
and social position. In rites de passage, Van Gennep identified three
phases: separation, limen, and re-attachment to a stable or recurrent,
culturally recognized condition. 12 The first and last phases "detach
ritual subjects from their old places in society and return them,
inwardly transformed and outwardly changed." 13
11. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE {Routledge and Kegan Paul
1960) (1909).
12. VICTOR TURNER, Variations on a Theme of Liminality, in BLAZING THE TRAIL 48,
48 (University of Arizona Press 1992) [hereinafter TURNER, Variations]. For Turner's
discussion of Van Gennep's work, see VICTOR TURNER, Morality and Liminality, in
BLAZING THE TRAIL 132, 133 (University of Arizona Press 1992) [hereinafter TURNER,

Morality].
13. TURNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 48-49.
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The middle, or liminal, phase is categorically trickier. "Limen"
literally means a "threshold," though in some protracted rites it is
more like a corridor or a tunnel.14 Victor Turner, elaborating on Van
Gennep's theme, identifies odd properties associated with this place
of midtransition, liminality. First is being betwixt and between. The
liminal state by definition is located between established states of
politico-jural structure. Those occupying a space of liminality
"evade ordinary cognitive classification, too, for they are not this or
that, here or there, one thing or the other."15 They suffer a paradox
characteristic of liminality, of being "both this and that."16 It is in the
paradox of being two things at once, that as a result the liminal
subject is culturally and socially recognized as neither. The
novitiate is · of both secular and sacred, and thus is neither
parishoner nor priest.
A second odd property of liminality is that of existing in a state
of potentiality. Let's start by comparing the "liminal state" with
normal affairs in the world of productive forces (such as banks,
parliaments, law firms, universities). Action to maintain the
systems and personnel of control of this world takes place in a
culture's "indicative mood."17 In this linguistic analogy, Turner
suggests that normal sociocultural processes have to do with what
most cultures would label as "actual," that is, "existing or
happening 'in fact,' not merely seeming to be so - pretended,
imagined, fictitious, or ostensible."18 By contrast, life may also be
experienced in subjunctive or optative moods. Turner cites
Webster's definition of "subjunctive": '"designating or of that mood
of a verb used to express supposition, desire, hypothesis, possibility,
etc., rather than to state an actual fact."'19 (Similarly, the optative
mood expresses wish or desire.) "The liminal or central phase of
elaborate ritual," Turner concludes, "is clearly dominated by the
subjunctive mood of culture."20
Change does not automatically place one in a liminal state. To
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
TuRNER, Morality, supra note 12, at 133-34.
Id.
Id.
20. Id.
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understand the analogy to indicative or subjunctive moods, contrast
characterizations of life in post-Soviet Ukraine with the perennial
metaphorical space of American change, the frontier. Whether for
pioneers in covered wagons, astronauts in spaceships, or scientists
on the verge of a new discovery, life on the American frontier is
emphatically in the indicative. This is real life, actual, exciting. Since
the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine has been described as a state in
"transition" or as an "emerging economy." Rather than occupying
the defined space of a frontier, its limits are fuzzy. The point of
departure is specified - Ukraine is "post-Soviet," "post-Socialist."
Life in this transitional state is, if nothing else, life in the perpetual
subjunctive.
Turner might not be surprised by the nostalgia for Soviet times
that social scientists note surging through post-Soviet subjects,21
given their long stay in a liminal phase and its state of potentiality.
"Actuality, in the liminal state, gives way to possibility, and
aberrant possibilities reveal once more to luminaries the value of
what has hitherto been regarded as the somewhat tedious daily
round."22 The tedious daily round can also be considered the good
old days; some Ukrainians labeled "pro-Russian" might be more
aptly described as "nostalgically Soviet."
Even post-Soviet Ukrainians, who are decidedly not nostalgic
for a Soviet past, express distaste for liminality. Ukrainian writer
Yuri Androkhovych's exchange with a Spanish interviewer is a
telling example. From the start, Andrukhovych's attempt to make a
straightforward statement about his European influences is tripped
up by myriad changing forms, altered states and toponyms
unavoidably tangling up a simple sentence. "[L]ike all intellectuals
in his country," Andrukhovych is "crazy about everything
European. 'My literary references are European. Paul Celan [a
'German' writer] was born in Chernivtsi, a town that was Romanian
at the time and subsequently became Ukrainian. There are several
towns that have changed state or name over the years."' 23
Andrukhovych takes changing forms in stride. His own hometown
21. See, e.g., SVETLANA BOYM, THE FUTURE OF NOSTALGIA (Basic Books 2001).
22. TURNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 49.
23. Xavi Ayen, The Europeanism of Ukrainian Writers, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 18,
2006 [hereinafter Ayen, Ukrainian Writers]. On Chemivtsi, its variability, and its
role in European sociology of law, see Monica Eppinger, Governing in the Vernacular:
Eugen Ehrlich and Late Habsburg Ethnography, in LMNG LAW: RECONSIDERING EUGEN
EHRLICH 21-48 (Marc Hertogh, ed., Hart Publishing Limited 2009).
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changed from the Austro-Hungarian Stanyslaviv to the Soviet
Ivano-Frankovsk and then to the Ukrainian Ivano-Frankivsk.24
Similarly, nearby Austrian Lemberg became Soviet Lvov and is now
Ukrainian Lviv. But even in this Cheshire-cat zoo of changing
forms, Andrukhovych clearly objects to some categorizations of his
world: "For us, it was dramatic that an author like Samuel
Huntington should draw a categorical frontier between East and
West. According to him, we are a border zone between what is and
is not Europe, a sort of limbo land stretched between two worlds."25
In referencing liminality, then, I do not side those who would
conceptually place Ukraine in a limbo land, consign it to a border
zone at the edge of Europe, or make of it a new "buffer state"
between NATO and the East. Recall that liminality, though
employing a spatial metaphor, is actually a temporal term:
liminality refers to a time of mid-transition. It is not a space and its
subjects are assumed to be in motion. In order to avoid confusion
or offense, for a spatial locator, we could borrow a metaphor from
American law, the penumbra. In U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence,
certain freedoms or privileges are held to exist by virtue of a certain
relationship to a Constitutional right or guarantee.26 Put another
way, certain Constitutional guarantees depend on the realization of
other freedoms to give the guarantees "life and substance,"27 or, in
Turner's terms, actuality. These freedoms protected by virtue of
their relation to core enumerated rights are said to exist "in the
penumbra" of those rights. The penumbra, then, is a zone of
permitted or enabled practices that exist by virtue of a relationship
to rights, guarantees, or laws enumerated in written documents
issued by the appropriate authoritative body.
Does Ukraine stand in the penumbra of Europe? An empirical
investigation into whether this designation is apt might examine the
jurisdiction of Europe. European integration may be understood in
part as a project of harmonizing laws and behavior shaped by
laws.28 I propose that European integration in the domain of law
24. For treatment of this transposition of the local, see YURI ANDRUKHOVYCH,
(2006).
25. Ayen, Ukrainian Writers, supra note 23.
26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965) ("specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance").
27. Id.
28. For a theoretical stance that might regard such projects or claims with

DESORIENTATSIYA NA MISTSEVOSTI [DISORIENTATION IN PLACE]
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and law-abiding behavior is achieved, even beyond the formal
bounds of the European Union, if EU regulation creates areas
outside the formal boundaries of the Union in which behaviors
harmonize themselves with the European. How far beyond the
borders of the EU do EU regulations regulate? How much
European integration is achieved by EU policy decisions beyond the
jurisdiction of the EU?
One concrete example, biofuels policy, provides some insight.
Consider the transformed landscape of north central Ukraine; in
only one season it shifted from its traditional dull brownish palette
of wheat to the almost fluorescent yellow of rapeseed. Neon yellow
now stretches to the horizon. A manager in the Kyiv office of
Monsanto, one of the leading international marketers of seed in
Ukraine, explains that Ukrainians began to cultivate rapeseed
primarily for EU biofuel use. Rapeseed cultivation on any scale only
started in 2004 and by 2006, there were 600,000 hectares devoted to
rapeseed (especially winter rape; but also some Canola spring
rape). 29 What set off this change? New EU mandates required that
member countries contribute a certain amount of raw material for
biofuel. Consequently, the Lithuanian government purchased part
of its quota directly from Ukrainian farmers; German farmers grew
their own, but German oil presses then needed substitute oilseeds,
which they purchased from Ukrainian growers.30 The director of
"Agrimatko," a seed franchise in Kherson, a small city deep in the
southern Ukraine wheat belt, told me in 2006,
[t]here's a boom this year in rapeseed and com because of
biodiesel. It's huge. Everyone switched this year. You (the U.S.)
already have plants [kombinat] that convert corn to fuel. We may
here, someday. But even before we do, biofuel in Europe is
raising our prices. Prices for rapeseed and corn are up 100% from
last year. If you could get $50/ha from them last year, this year
you get $100.31

skepticism, see LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A
MOUNTAIN ZAPOTEC VILLAGE (Stanford University Press 1990).
29. Interview with Nikolay Vidkritiy, Director of Ecological Permitting,
Monsanto Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine (Dec.12, 2006).
30. Interview with Stephan Kresse, agricultural attache, German Embassy, in
Kyiv, Ukraine (Feb. 19, 2007).
31. Interview with Ihor Molodiy, Director of southern Ukraine distribution for
agricultural supplier Agrimatko, in Kherson, Ukraine Oune 7, 2006).
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Where Westerners might take such interconnectedness for granted,
this direct effect of European policies upon their landscape is, for
Ukrainians, a startling and post-Iron-Curtain experience.
The concepts of liminality and penumbra give us some insight
into the reference states of time and place in contemporary Ukraine.
Let us reconsider the pervasiveness of the "evro" referent. In some
respects, Ukrainians are living "as if" they were in Europe:
undertaking Evroremont, buying eyeglass frames of Evrostyle,
buying chicken from the Evrogrill. During life in a liminal state,
even someone living in the subjunctive is living "as-if" ...
something. For most Ukrainians, the aspirational referent is Europe.
In other respects, those very same Ukrainians are already
undertaking projects, shaping practices, and internalizing
regulations and standards framed in Europe. They are growing
rapeseed to fulfill EU policies, and producing crops to European
regulations and specifications. They already live by Evrostandardti.
This is life in the indicative mood, the state of actuality instead of
potentiality. In some respects, then, in the as-if and what-if life of
the liminal phase, Europe is the aspirational referent.32 In other
respects, Europe casts the shadow under which actual life in
Ukraine already carries out its everyday performances. Data on
some current practices support the proposition that Ukrainians
already live in the penumbra of Europe.
Liminiality is a space of open possibility, but that does not
necessarily imply its burdens are lighter. In fact, it can be grinding.
Ukrainians might nod knowingly at Turner's description that those
in the liminal space
may be said to be in a process of being ground down into a sort of
homogenous social matter, in which possibilities of differentiation
may still be glimpsed, then later positively refashioned into
specific shapes compatible with their new postliminal duties and
rights as incumbents of a new status and state. The grinding
down process is accomplished by ordeals: circumcision,
32. Perhaps a Ukrainian predisposition for a certain frame of reference for this
imaginary was prefigured by the "imaginary West" familiar to the Soviet
mentalscape. Certainly, my work on this post-Soviet imaginary is indebted to
Alexei Yurchak's research into the "imaginary West" of the late Soviet period. See
ALEXEI YURCHAK, EVERYrHING WAS FOREVER, UNTIL IT WAS No MORE: THE LAST SoVIET
GENERATION (Princeton University Press 2006), especially chapter 5, Imaginary West,
the Elsewhere of Late Socialism, 158-206.
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subincision, clitoridectomy, hazing ...and the like.33

The ordeals of being "in transition," of being post-Soviet and
pre-something else, seem to have come in successive waves, each
one faithlessly promising the end is nigh. The promises, expressed
implicitly and explicitly by Western governments and investors,
read: if only you allow multiple parties; introduce a new currency;
draft a new Constitution; end collective ownership; privatize
property; and so forth and so on, then will you accomplish
transition. It turns out each step is a necessary but not sufficient
condition. The heterogenous group of those who have interested
themselves in the reformation of post-Soviet Ukraine - Western
donor governments, international financial institutions, legions of
(sometimes merely hypothetical) foreign direct investors - have
always had one more item on the to-do list. Referring to the series
of ordeals as "transition" is not an empirical statement of fact. It is,
rather, a performative speech act34 whose felicity is as yet
unconfirmed. Affixing the label "transition" does have several
effects (that Austin would call "perlocutionary"35). It induces
Ukrianian parliamentarians and executive branch officials, and the
academics who assist them, to take the next trudging step, and it
reinforces to the average person that there is a narrative arc to this
series of profound transformations, with its own internal logic,
which will sometime lead to a conclusion.
Liminality is exhausting also because it is a locus of intense,
sometimes relentless, training. The liminal subject is the target of
instruction. Reduction, grinding down, is followed by
reconstruction: "The rebuilding process is by instruction, partly in
practical skills, partly in tribal esoterica, and proceeds by both
verbal and nonverbal symbolic means."36 This insight of Turner's
takes us directly to Ukrainian legal reform and what Ukrainians
think of that West so actively and directly involved.

V. Deixis, Liminality and Hegemony
A large body of data on hegemony and power emerges in my
33. TuRNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 49-50.
34. For an explanation of performative speech acts and felicity conditions, see
JOHN L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (Harvard University Press 1962).
35. See JOHN L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (Harvard University
Press 1962).
36. TuRNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 49-50.
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research. We will look specifically at two examples: (1) land
privatization, the act of creating private ownership in real property;
and (2) drafting a Corporate Code, the overarching law regulating
activities of new private-sector firms. Land privatization was
accomplished in a new Land Code passed by the Ukrainian
parliament in 2001.37 In order to understand hegemony and the
transplant of legal ideas, I investigated how land privatization,
including this new law, came about. In brief, agricultural land was
stripped from collective ownership and placed in private hands
through a series of legal steps, including a landmark 1999
presidential decree.38 Commenting on it, one expert told me, "The
decisive stroke was not the privatization of land ownership. It was
the outlawing of collective ownership."39 According to the lead
agricultural expert for the U.S. Agency for International
Development ("USAID") Kyiv mission (himself a Canadian), the
1999 decree resulted from the work of several actors: the Iowa State
Agricultural Project; a USAID contractor, Ronco; the U.S. Embassy;
and the I.M.F. ("back when it still imposed detailed
conditionalities"). The most important, consistent leading actor was
the USAID Kyiv Mission itself. "We [USAID] weren't nothing in
this - we wrote the thing [the decree]," he told me.40 Other players
included the International Finance Corporation ("IFC") in Donetsk
and the British aid organization, "but," said the USAID agricultural
expert, "AID pushed the hardest."41 Similarly, in regard to urban
real estate, "the USAID Commercial Law Project wrote the
Mortgage Law that passed in 2004."42 So goes the history to create
37. Land Code of Ukraine, 2001 Laws No. 2905-III (adopted Oct. 25, 2001,
signed by President Kuchma Nov. 13, 2001, and published in Uryadovy Kur'yer
[Government Courier, the official reporter of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine]
Nov. 15, 2001).
38. Pro Nevidkladni Zakhodi shchodo Priskorennya Reformuvannya
Ahramoho Sektora Ekonorniki {flpo Heei,!U(JlanHi 3axoni �ono flpHcKopeHHa
Pe<j>opM)'eaHHa
ArpapHoro CeKTopa EKOHOMiKH) (On the Uninvested Means
concerning Accelerating Reform of the Agrarian Sector of the Economy) Decree of
the President of Ukraine No. 1529/99 of Dec. 3, 1999 reprinted in 3AKOHO,[(ABCTBO
YKPAIHl1 IlPo 3EMJIIO {LEGISLATION OF UKRAINE ON LAND), 85 (Kiev: Urinkom Inter,
2002).
39. Interview with Bohdan Nezgrabniy, Director of Agricultural Reforms,
USAID Kyiv Mission (Apr. 16, 2007).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The mortgage law referred to is Pro Ipoteku (Ilpo IrroTeey) (On
Mortgages), 2003 Law of Ukraine 898-IV (adopted June 5, 2003, entry into force Jan.
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private property and a secondary market for real property, at least
through the donors' telling.
These programs were part of a gargantuan effort to reform
Ukraine. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and because of its
perceived geostrategic importance, Ukraine became the object of a
massive amount of attention from enormously funded Western
assistance projects.43 By the late 1990s, Ukraine was the target of the
largest amount of U.S. assistance in the world, following only
Camp-David mandated assistance to Israel and Egypt.44 In these
projects, money flows from Western governments to Western
organizations and Western personnel; assistance finally reaches
Ukraine in the form of "advice" from "experts." We [in the West]
helped them. Here, we had knowledge; there, they needed re
forming. Here, we were the inheritors of stable forms; there, they
were the unexpecting recipients of rupture. It was up to the West to
pass forms, and stability (in our image), on to them. To Ukrainians
the grinding down and the instruction grind on.
Clearly, seen in this respect, paying attention to deictics and
liminality attunes us to power differentials and power plays. Who
has the questions, and who, the answers, are indicators of power
structuring discourse. Likewise, analysis of discourses of inclusion
and exclusion takes us to the ground of hegemony. Hegemony does
not operate on autopilot, though. When we recognize it, we should
not suspend inquiry by assuming too much about the trajectory of
hegemonic practices after they are launched.
On one hand, as the USAID agricultural expert described, we
see a heavy-handed intervention, a very direct version of legal
transplanting, in which the West in various institutions is actually
1, 2004).
43. For an account of Western assistance in Eastern Europe, see JANINE WEDEL,
COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN AID TO EASTERN EUROPE
(Palgrave Macmillan 2001).
44. See, e.g., Review of U.S. Assistance Programs to Russia, Ukraine, and the New

Independent States: Hearing before the House Comm. on International Relations March

26, 1998, 105th Cong. 49-337 (1998) (statements of Ambassador Richard
Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Assistance
to the New Independent States and Coordinator of Assistance to the New
Independent States, Department of State, and Don Pressley, Acting Assistant
Administrator for Europe and the New Independent States, U.S. Agency for
International Development) available at http://comrndocs.house.gov/committees/
intlrel/hfa49337.000/hfa49337_Of.htm.
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drafting decrees and laws reshaping basic framework institutions.
On the other hand, from other reports, we see power relations
twisted in a different way. Another Western adviser, funded and
sent by the U.S. government in response to Ukrainian government
pleas for help after the Orange Revolution, recalls a series of long
meetings he held with then-Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov.
Zerkalo Nedeli, a well-regarded Ukrainian newspaper, had just run
an article exposing an entity that "negotiated" Ukrainian purchases
from Russia as essentially a non-transparent rent-collector. The
Western adviser told the Prime Minister that the entity yielded no
discernible value to Ukraine and existed for the sole purpose of
skimming off Ukrainian taxpayer money destined for the Russian
seller under contracts whose terms are never disclosed to the public.
This arrangement, by the way, did not affect the U.S. directly. These
were not, for example, funds that otherwise would have gone to
U.S. vendors or contracts for goods which U.S. firms could have
supplied. The advice in this case was rendered in a good-faith
analysis of how to eliminate dead-weight loss from the strapped
Ukrainian government budget. The adviser's primary advice was to
cut the entity out of the process; the Prime Minister's response was
smiling and nodding. This, the adviser later learned, occurred
during precisely the same period Yekhanurov was meeting with
principals of the disdained entity, in meetings that yielded
prolongation of its involvement.45
Hegemony? Who's gaming whom? I was reminded of this on
a less grand scale when I interviewed the open and energetic
director of an agricultural cooperative in Crimea. The co-op was a
"recollectivization" of farmers who had received their land plots
three years earlier. I asked him why they formed the co-op. He
answered, "Because the UN had a program of providing advice
[and perhaps credit] available only to ag coops; so we formed a co
op so we could get the advice. But the co-op's working ok, so
maybe we'll keep it going."46 These practices show a relation to "the
West," the outsider, or the potential power that defies predictions
based on a basic read of power asymmetries. What do we call the
feint in the face of hegemony, a feint that might be constitutive?
45. Interview with Eric Mukden, adviser to the Ukrainian government Ouly 30,
2007).
46. Interview with Viktor Metushchenko, director of Armyan village
cooperative Oune 9, 2007).
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Another set of data that defies expectations of hegemony as a
frame for practices of submission or dominance can be analyzed
under the heading of a Ukrainian perception of the West as a
resource. My research shows Ukrainians using the West as a
resource in a variety of interesting ways. For example, consider a
property dispute over a 1,000-year-old church on the edge of Kyiv,
home of the oldest intact icons in Russian Orthodoxy. Church
leaders (Ukrainian but Russian Orthodox under the authority of the
Moscow patriarchate) alleged that the frescoes and paintings were
not iconic enough and intimated the correct course would be to
paint over them.47 In this dispute, Ukrainian preservationists relied
on the West as a source of outrage, attention, and protection from
internal sources of harm.48
A Ukrainian parliamentarian described using the West during a
particularly violent battle over checks and balances with the
executive branch of the Ukrainian government. Then-President
Kuchma had ordered a hit on a gadfly journalist by the security
forces, which made the journalist's death look like the act of
common criminals. The President then tried to intimidate and
threaten any in the legislature who investigated the death or
proposed accountability for executive-branch wrongdoing. During
this incident, Ukrainian parliamentarians relied on the West,
especially Europe, as a source of outrage, attention, and protection as an audience in front of whom the Ukrainian elite were capable of
feeling shame - from internal sources of harm. Parliamentarians
report that statements by the Vienna Commission were particularly
helpful in protecting opposition leaders and keeping safe those who
would build a movement for accountability.49

The West is also seen as a source of funding, record-keeping
practices, and personnel for accomplishing basic goals of
governance by cash-strapped government institutions. "Our
experience in working on legislative drafting [with the Ministry of
Justice and other executive-branch agencies] is any department you
take has four people, maximum. That leads to the fact that they are

47. Interview with Father Dohlyadachniy, Russian Orthodox (Moxcow
Patriarchate) priest (Oct. 30, 2007).
48. Interview with Irina Spromozhna, Deputy Director for Scholarly Research at
the St. Sophia National Museum complex (Nov. 26, 2007).
49. Telephone interview Ihor Pryamoyevych, supra note 1.
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the least aware people in terms of keeping records or statistics."so
The Ministry of Justice used Western NGOs and USAID and EU
contractors as a source of needed capacity to fulfill basic functions:
to gather data, analyze statistics, and generate reports upon which
the Ministry relied for making policy and struggling over resources.
How many court cases are seen per week, per judge? These are the
kinds of mundane details upon which budget requests rely, the
tedious collection of which is outsourced at Western government
donors' expense to Western organizations.
Similarly, the West is seen as a source of positive ideas, and the
money to back them. The Ukrainian Legal Foundation ("U.L.F.")
began as a largely Canadian-funded think-tank headed by Serhiy
Holovatiy, a parliamentarian who went on to become Ukraine's
Minister of Justice.51 The co-director of U.L.F. was Canadian Halyna
Freeland. Freeland organized trainings for interested Ukrainian
law-makers in topics germaine to fundamental measures of
desovietization: setting up laws on freedom of press, conscience,
and association; government transparency and accountability; and
multiparty elections. Through U.L.F., she provided research
resources, fancy (Evroremonted!) office space, and a prestigious
platform for reformers like Holovatiy. The chair of a highly
regarded law school in Kyiv told me,
That's the reason I'm in Kyiv, by the way. I was in Ivano
Frankivsk [a small city in Western Ukraine], teaching in the law
school and seeing Holovatiy on t.v. [when they were writing civil
liberties into the constitution]. I found myself thinking, 'I should
be working with him. He is doing what the country needs.' So I
came to Kyiv to work for the Ukrainian Legal Foundation.52

The office space and the salary, basic enabling elements, for
those who saw themselves working altruistically for the good of
their new country was openly provided by the West.
Another Ukrainian law professor, presently working on a
50. Interview with Tanya Shchelepnava, Deputy Director of Rule of Law
Programs, American Bar Association Central and Eastern European Law Initiative
Kyiv office Oune 21, 2007).
51. For information on the Ukrainian Legal Foundation, see THE Posr-SovIET
HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNET RESOURCFS
(University of Washington Press 1999) (1996). See also http://www.civilsoc.org/
nisorgs/ukraine/kyiv/lglfnd.htrn.
52. Interview with Myroslava Adamovych, Chair of Law Faculty, Kyiv Mohyla
Academy (Apr. 13, 2007).
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committee drafting a new Corporate Code, related his experience
with Western legal advising. An American law professor, funded
through Western government aid programs, came to help his
committee. Several years ago, "he drafted us a beautiful Code, just
beautiful. But he left it with us. Now that our committee has
worked on it for five years, it's a total mess. Poor Professor X. We
ruined his code. Now it's just a disaster."53 Contrast this, and the
USAID agricultural adviser's report, with the rapeseed revolution.
If this is "hegemony," it involves something more complicated than
easily stereotyped domination and resistance.
The West is seen as a resource in other ways, to balance the
potentially heavy influence of Russia by Ukrainians who see
independence as refutation of a colonial legacy that had come to
Ukraine from the East, not the West. For these Ukrainians, Moscow
is seen as former (and perhaps future) colonial master. One adviser
to the Ukrainian President described the efforts of the Russian
government "to turn imperial leanings into practical political
measures." What is the antidote? In his words, "Evrostandardti."
European standards, he suggested, offer alternate forms for social
integration and action.s4
Another dimension of this complex dynamic was the subject of
a presentation to an internal audience of policy professionals at a
Kyiv institute. A Kyiv professor analyzed how Ukrainians are being
formed by the outreach of others. Ukrainian airwaves are
bombarded with commercials and dubbed foreign shows; Ukrainian
ports are flooded with foreign goods; and Ukrainian consumers are
created via the messages of Western companies' billboards,
magazines, movie trailers. Ukrainians understand they are the
target of a mass attempt from people outside to reach them. An
almost Althusserian sense of interpellation, of being called, by
projections of the Other across borders onto Ukrainian space, comes
through in her analysis. "The Other presents itself to us in
communications, through trade, via the internet, through
Unexpectedly, the professor expressed the
advertisements."
perception that practices of mimesis may make the Other like us,
53. Interview with Anatoliy Spivrotbitniy, law professor and member of
Corporate Code drafting committee under the parliament of Ukraine (Nov. 17,
2007).
54. Ivan Ivanchenko, Professor at Ukrainian Institute for Policy and adviser to
President Yushchenko on Social Policy, Address on "Corporatized Society and
Corruption," at Ukrainian Institute for Policy, Kyiv, Ukraine Ouly 17, 2007).
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rather than vice versa. "If I consume this fast food, this good, they'll
be like me," is how the she put it. (Note how she framed it, "They'll
be like me," not, "I'll be like them.") The ambivalence inherent in
relationships with a West which may itself channel hegemonic
power relations or provide resources for reshaping internal or
regional power dynamics came through clearly in the wistful
realism of her conclusion that, "A meeting with 'the Other' does not
happen 'ne konfliktniy,"' that is, "without conflict."55

VI. Time and Transitions
Anthropologist Benjamin Whorf, discussing Edward Sapir's
hypothesis on the relationship between language and cognition,
suggests we recognize the influence language has on other activities,
cultural and personal, in its constant ways of arranging data.56
Whorf' s paradigmatic example is European languages' use of spatial
metaphors for non-spatial concepts like time. Time is conceived as
running in a straight line. The future lies ahead of us; the past,
behind. Language so organizes data through metaphor and
categorization that we are not even aware of this as an
organizational metaphor. It becomes the framing for our lived
experience, part of our reality. Whorf's particular example about
spatial metaphor organizing the experience of time led me to an
insight about a contemporary Ukrainian experience of the West.
I propose that liminality is yet one more example of the elision
Whorf points out. The limen, the threshold, a spatial term, becomes
the name for a period of time. Ukrainians', and others', discourse
on the post-Soviet experience presumes liminality. In other words,
it presumes that there will be a stable state to reach at the end of this
so-called transition period. Referring to the post-Soviet period as a
transition, the economy as "emerging," uses imagery of moving
through space, liminal space, as metaphor for moving through a
certain period of time.
This takes us back to deictics, those context-dependent
linguistic expressions. In a time of rapid social change under
55. Oksana Ilyich, professor at Ukrainian Institute for Policy, Address on "The
Strategic Stance towards The Other in Formation of Interests," at Ukrainian
Institute for Policy, Kyiv, Ukraine Ouly 17, 2007).
56. Benjamin Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language
[1947], in LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND SocIETY: A BOOK OF READINGS 64, 64 (Ben E.
Blount ed., Waveland Press 1995) (1974).
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conditions of discursive rupture such as the transition in Ukraine,
the use of deictics reveals some of the concepts and referents in
motion. When I asked Ihor, the former parliamentarian, what
Ukrainians think of the West, he answered through temporal
framing. "What a Ukrainian thinks of 'Europe' depends on his or
her strategic choice. Where do they see their future?"57 In his
answer, Europe is not only a place, it is the repository for a time.
What Ukrainians think of "the West" has changed as their own
locational referents and anticipated futures became untethered.
Europe, in the Soviet mental geography and use of the word, used
to be "over there." Now, for post-Soviet Ukrainians, "Europe" is
"then" (noTiM, potim), a way of conceptualizing the future. 58 Here,
the liminal space is a space of the subjunctive and not the indicative,
the space of possibilities.
Ukrainians are exhausted with the post-Soviet "transition" in
part because although it has a well-defined starting point, the end
seems to recede in the distance the more "reforms" Ukrainians
subject themselves to. Social changes initiated by legal transplants
have been massive, fundamental, and relentless for the last two
decades. Turner's words could be taken as a warning: "[P]assing
from dynamics to statics, [liminality] may cease to be a mere
transition and become a set way of life, a state, that of the anchorite
or monk."59 Has liminality ceased to be a transition and instead
become its own way of life for post-Soviet Ukrainians? (Or, was
"transition" a fiction by implying a non-existent endpoint in the first
place?) Will there ever be a "new normal?" Where, oh where, is the
Europe at the end of the rainbow?

VII. Whither Europe?
Ukraine is a country with a divided public; many are not "pro
Westem." In their collective imagination of a future, "Europe"
functions for some Ukrainians as a standard of material comfort to
be achieved, but otherwise as an entity from which to differentiate.
57. Telephone interview with Ihor Pryamoyevych, (Dec. 26, 2008).
58. This distinguishes the orientation of Ukrainians from some other post
Socialist central Europeans for whom "Europe" is (or was) a destination of
"return," a re-connection to a seemingly lost past. See, e.g., KATHERINE VERDERY
Civil Society or Nation? "Europe" in the Symbolism of PostSocialist Politics, in WHAT
WASSocIALISM, AND WHAT COMES NEXT? 104 (Princeton University Press 1996).
59. Turner, Variations, supra note 12, at 49.
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However, for many others, Europe functions as the imaginary outer
right bracket of this liminal space, as "the future," a comforting
imaginary endpoint to the process of transition and a collective with
which to identify in an unanticipated process of nation-building.
In the present, "Europe" is a frame for the performance of being
European.60 The concept of penumbra allows us to see and study
effects of law and regulation without restricting our gaze to
jurisdictional boundaries. For Ukrainian farmers planting rape
seed, it is immaterial whether they stand in a shadow or at the heart
of Europe. Their daily activities are formed by goals no longer
Soviet, nor experimentally post-Soviet. They are European. For
many Ukrainians, then, in the sense of everyday experience,
Ukraine is already part of Europe. Even within this actuality,
however, potentiality also moves. Europe becomes a goal, a point in
the future towards which a messy and uncertain present is moving.
And in this, too, it functions to structure performance and affect in
the present.
The 2006 Prize for European Understanding of the Leipzig Book
Fair went to Ukrainian novelist Yuri Andrukhovych. In his
acceptance speech, he referred to the terrible cost borne by Ukraine
in the last century in which it was the battered and bloodied frontier
between mutually antagonistic West and East. Andrukhovych
plead, "It is crucially important for me that you help this cursed
country." He chastised the EU commissioner on record as opposing
Ukraine's eventual entry into the EU and poignantly appealed to all
Europeans, "[I]t wouldn't be so terribly difficult for you to help this
country. It would simply be a matter of not saying anything that
will kill our hope." 61
Why is "Europe" such a pervasive referent in Ukraine? In large
part because of anxiety over the detachment from the former stable
cultural forms. Fixation with "Europe" gives an endpoint to the
current indeterminate and difficult state; to use Turner's three-stage
description, by postulating an end stage, a set of stable forms to
which the reformed Ukraine will become attached, Ukrainians can
imagine that they are in a middle stage, a liminal state, and that this
60. On performance and everyday life, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION
OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Doubleday 1959).
61. Yuri Andrukhovych, Address on receiving the 2006 Prize for European
Understanding at the Leipzig Book Fair, reprinted in SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Mar.
16, 2006.
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condition is transitory. Becoming "European" is a teleological goal,
a mappable geographical destination for life in the liminal
subjunctive. It is a practical answer to everyday questions, prior
answers to which disappeared with the Soviet system. In this sense,
"Europe" is the converse of "Communism." Soviet Ukrainians
worked, in the actuality of lived experience, in a well-established set
of everyday tasks and performances towards a taken-for-granted
future that existed (yet) nowhere, Communism. Post-Soviet
Ukrainians move, through an as-if present continually subject to
experimentation and change, towards a not-taken-for-granted future
that does exist, just to the West, already. "Way over there" has
come all the way up to the border and become the new future, the
new "potim [noTiM]" the new "then." The mood is subjunctive more
than optative; the affective structure could not be characterized as
optimistic, but within one discerns a wary hope.

